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Water pricing can be understood as an important root of water quantity and water quality 
problems in developing countries – but also as a possible solution to them. This paper proposes 
an analytical framework to understand challenges related to pricing water supply and sanitation. 
The framework rests on three criteria: efficiency, cost-recovery and affordability. It highlights that 
the actual effects of water pricing do not only depend on its design but also on the institutional 
and technical environment it is embedded in. The framework is used to identify and analyze 
challenges to water pricing for the case of water supply and sanitation system in Lima, Peru.  
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1 Introduction 
Water supply is subject to important problems in many developing countries throughout the 
world. Particularly arid and semi-arid areas are facing severe water scarcity. Moreover, water 
supplied often does not met minimum quality standards. These basic problems are aggravated by 
deficiencies in water supply and sanitation infrastructure. For example, significant water losses in 
the network may contribute to water scarcity. Lacking wastewater treatment may be one source 
of water pollution. Moreover, consumption patterns of at least some (wealthier) parts of society 
may foster an excessive use of the scarce resource water. 
Inappropriate water prices can be understood as a decisive root of many of these problems – and 
reforming water prices may be one possible solution to them. Water pricing provides revenues to 
water suppliers, which these can reinvest in the maintenance, improvement and extension of 
water supply and sanitation infrastructure. Water prices also set incentives to save water and may 
thus promote a sustainable use of water (Rogers et al. 2002, p. 2; OECD 2010). 
However, the design and the implementation of water prices are subject to substantial challenges. 
In general, prices have been found to be very low in most developing countries (see, e.g., Briscoe 
1997). This observation can be attributed to a variety of reasons. Pricing has to meet multiple, 
possibly conflicting criteria and policy objectives (OECD 2009). Pricing systems may be subject 
to institutional constraints. These may include legal restrictions, informational problems or 
underlying informal rules, such as the perception of water as a basic right (e.g., Dinar and Saleth 
2005; le Blanc 2008). Moreover, the pricing system will also be influenced by political 
considerations related to the water sector. For example, politicians may tend to favour low-price 
systems in order to be re-elected (for an overview, see Dinar 2000). 
To organize and better understand the challenges surrounding water pricing, this article proposes 
an analytical framework. This framework is based on a set of three criteria, which are decisive 
when it comes to water pricing: efficiency, cost recovery and affordability. Furthermore, the 
framework emphasizes that different dimensions have to be taken into account in order to assess 
the performance of water pricing system with respect to these criteria. These dimensions include 
the design of the water price itself – but also the institutional as well as the technical environment 
into which the water price is embedded. 
The framework is applied in this paper to evaluate the performance of the existing water pricing 
system in Lima, the capital of Peru. Lima, one of the largest megacities in Latin America, is facing 
severe problems of water quantity. Water availability is generally low due to Lima’s location in the 
desert. Precipitation is virtually nonexistent. The groundwater table is continuously lowering. The 
 4
                                                
city primarily depends on water from glaciers and precipitation in the Andes, which is transported 
to Lima by three minor rivers. Climate change is likely to cause significant impacts on these 
sources. In fact, Peru is considered as one of the countries most strongly affected by climate 
change worldwide (Rosenberger 2006). Water scarcity is coupled with a high demand for water. 
First of all, this is due to the large population of the city. It currently amounts to some eight to 
nine million inhabitants and is expected to grow by two percent annually. Moreover, per-capita 
consumption of water is very high. Estimates range from 150 to 260 litres per person and day. 
These problems are deteriorated by shortcomings in Lima’s water supply and sanitation 
infrastructure. 10 percent of Lima’s population, or roughly one million inhabitants, are not 
connected to the network. Some 30 to 40 percent of the water entering the network is lost on the 
way to the customer. Only about 15 percent of the wastewater is treated, and hardly any of it is 
reused (SUNASS 2007). These problems illustrate that substantial investments in infrastructure 
are needed in the future. Moreover, behavioural changes are needed in order to reduce per-capita 
water consumption of Lima’s inhabitants. This article examines to what extent the current water 
pricing system does effectively address these issues. In this context, it considers the wide array of 
criteria and restrictions guiding decisions in the water sector. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the analytical framework. It presents the 
evaluation criteria as well as the relevant dimensions of water pricing. Section 3 describes and 
evaluates the current water pricing system in Lima using the analytical framework. Section 4 
concludes and derives policy recommendations. 
2 Analytical Framework 
This section first of all presents the criteria which are important when it comes to evaluating 
water pricing systems. Subsequently, it introduces the different dimensions of a water pricing 
system which have to be taken into account in order to be able to assess the performance of the 
system with respect to the different criteria. 
2.1 Criteria 
This paper focuses on three criteria which are particularly important with respect to water 
pricing: efficiency, cost recovery and affordability.1 
 
1 In fact, there are many more criteria which may be considered, such as equity, fairness, transparency, simplicity or 
administrative ease (for an overview, see e.g., Rogers et al. 2002, p. 6). 
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The criterion of efficiency refers to the welfare of the society as a whole. Welfare computes as the 
difference between benefits and costs of water use. The efficiency of water consumption rests on 
two questions (Bithas 2008, p. 223): (1) Is the aggregate quantity of water consumed by a society 
optimal? (2) Is this aggregate quantity of water consumption allocated optimally to different 
possible users? (1) In economic terms, the aggregate optimum is attained when marginal costs of 
water consumption equal the marginal benefits. In this case, the cost of consuming one more unit 
of water would exceed the corresponding benefits. In order to determine the optimal level of 
overall consumption, the full value and the full cost of water supply should be taken into 
account. The full value includes direct and indirect benefits to water users and third parties as 
well as intrinsic values. The full cost of water includes operation and maintenance costs, capital 
costs, opportunity costs and external environmental costs of water supply. In an ideal setting, 
these refer to the costs and benefits of present users as well as of future generations (Rogers et al. 
1998). Therefore, an efficient water price should be set equal to the full cost of the marginal unit 
of water supplied. (2) Allocation of water between different users is optimal when the marginal 
benefit of the last unit water consumed by each user is equal for all users. In this case, allocating 
yet another unit of water from one user to another would result in welfare losses to the former 
which would not be compensated by welfare gains to the latter user. An efficient allocation of 
water can be achieved by implementing a uniform price for all users. In this case, each user will 
consume water as long as his marginal benefits are higher than the price. Eventually, such 
mechanism provides for marginal benefits to be equalized across all users. 
The criterion of cost recovery addresses the needs of the water supplier. Firstly, the revenues 
resulting from water pricing should be sufficient to pay the costs of operating and maintaining 
the infrastructure for water supply and sanitation. Secondly, the revenues should also be available 
to recover the capital costs of investments, including the depreciation charges and interest rates 
for loans. Finally, water prices should also provide a return on capital at risk and a cash reserve 
for unexpected events (Whittington 2003, p. 63). Cost recovery requires that the water price be 
equal to the average cost of water supply. With a large amount of fixed costs (which is typical for 
water supply where large initial investments in infrastructure are needed), it may well turn out that 
average costs are higher than marginal costs (which refer to variable costs only). Thus, there may 
be a conflict between efficient and cost-recovering water pricing. The efficient price may be too 
low to recover the costs of the water supplier. 
Finally, the criterion of affordability focuses on the need of individual water consumers. 
Affordability means that each potential water user should be able to afford a subsistence amount 
of water irrespectively of his income. This criterion may be interpreted such that water prices 
should be below the full cost of water supply. It may also imply that the water price should be 
differentiated with respect to income. That is, poorer consumers should pay less for water than 
consumers with more resources. The price may also be differentiated with respect to some 
proxies to individual income, such as the level of water consumption or the average income of a 
neighbourhood. Alternatively, a water price could be accompanied by additional policy 
instruments, such as direct water subsidies for the poor. Mostly, affordable water price will 
violate the criterion of efficiency requiring uniform pricing at full cost: the average level of the 
price is too low and/or the incentives to use water are heterogeneous across water users. 
Addressing affordability may also produce conflicts with cost recovery when the average level of 
the water price is below the operation, maintenance and capital costs borne by the water supplier. 
This brief presentation illustrates that different criteria may have quite different implications for 
the optimal design of a water price. It will be highlighted in the following, however, that the 
actual performance of a water pricing system does not only depend on the design of the price but 
also its institutional and technical environment. 
2.2 Dimensions of the Water Pricing System 
In order to understand the effects of water pricing, it is necessary to apply a broad perspective 
which considers three important dimensions: the design of the water price, its institutional 
environment and its technical environment. These three dimensions are understood in this paper 
as the water pricing system (see Figure 1). That is, this system includes the proper water price but 
also goes beyond it.  































Of course, water price design is the dimension which first of all determines the effects of water 
pricing in reality. In this respect, it is useful to distinguish between grid-based water supply to 
customers connected to the network and decentralized water supply from wells or water tankers 
by private water vendors. Usually, only grid-based supply is subject to price regulation by the 
government. In contrast, decentralized water supply by vendors is often pretty close to a free, 
liberalized water market. Consequently, a discussion and evaluation of water price design is 
usually only carried out for grid-based supply where there are available means of government 
intervention. 
Four elements characterize the design of a water price. The first element is the definition of 
payer, i.e. the party that is obliged to actually pay for water. This could be, for example, the 
consumer of water or the discharger of wastewater but also the landlord of a rented house (so 
not the actual water user). The second component of water price design is the assessment base. It 
determines what the price has to be paid for. The assessment base may the quantity of water 
consumed, the quantity of wastewater discharged or the contamination of wastewater. Moreover, 
simpler measures such as a fixed price per grid connection or a price depending on the continuity 
of supply may also be applied. Thirdly, the average level of the water price is decisive. It can be 
determined on the basis of very different concepts, e.g. marginal costs versus average costs, full 
costs versus less than full costs, short-term versus long-term costs, any several more. Finally, the 
tariff determines how this average water price is actually imposed on different groups of 
customers. The tariff may be fixed, i.e. irrespective of water consumption, or variable, i.e. 
depending on water consumption. There may be a single-part tariff composed of a fixed or a 
variable charge or a two-part tariff including both types of charges. The tariff may be uniform, i.e. 
all consumers have to pay the same price per unit of water, or differentiated. 
Next to water price design, the institutional environment is a second important dimension 
determining the actual effects of water pricing. This environment includes, for example, the 
complex set of legal rules into which water price are embedded. Consumers’ decisions on water 
consumption may not only be guided by the price but also by regulation on water technologies, 
for example. That is, the entire effect of the policy mix has to be assessed. Moreover, 
informational capacities and restrictions (and the underlying transaction costs) may have an 
impact on how customers actually react to water prices. On the one hand, informational 
problems can be experienced by water users. Two questions are noteworthy in this respect: Are 
water users actually aware of the price the pay? This may not be the case when water is billed on 
an annual basis only or when water costs are included in the monthly rent. Are water users 
actually aware of available technologies to save water and their corresponding costs and benefits? 
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On the other hand, information may also be a constraint for the water supplier. Here, the 
question is whether the water supplier is actually capable of monitoring and enforcing water 
prices in reality? Otherwise, water customers may have an incentive to cheat. All these 
institutional constraints and conditions determine how water prices perform in reality. 
Finally, the technical environment also has an impact on how effective water prices actually are. The 
corresponding incentives can only be passed on directly and perfectly to water users which 
dispose of an individual, metered connection to the network. Otherwise, i.e. when there is a joint 
connection for multiple users and/or not metering, incentives are distorted. This is because in 
this case it is technically impossible to impose the price on the correct amount of water units 
used by each individual customer. Rather, the distribution of water costs has to be based on 
rough proxies to individual consumption. For example, the water bill for a joint connection may 
be equally divided by all users. 
What is more, prices set for grid-based water supply do not have a direct effect on decentralized 
water supply of course. Here, the incentive to use water only depends on the market prices 
demanded by water vendors. However, there may be an indirect link between both kinds of water 
supply when customers connected to the network sell water to other users not connected. In this 
case, the regulated grid-based price establishes a bottom line for decentralized water pricing. 
These considerations show that the different characteristics of the technical environment may 
have an important impact on the effects of water pricing as well. 
3 The Case Study: Water Pricing in Lima, Peru 
This section first of all presents the different dimensions of the existing water price system in 
Lima. Subsequently, the system is evaluated using the analytical framework derived in the 
previous section. Thus, it examines the efficiency, cost recovery and affordability of Lima’s water 
pricing system. The presentation and discussion of the Lima case study is based on an extensive 
document analysis. Moreover, multiple interviews were carried out in Lima with representatives 
of the regulatory authority SUNASS, the water supplier SEDAPAL, several non-governmental 
and development cooperation organizations as well as scientists. 
3.1 Description 
3.1.1 Water Price Design 
Generally, the design of the water price which may be imposed by Lima’s public water supplier 
SEDAPAL for grid-based supply is determined by the state regulatory authority SUNASS. The 
payers of water prices in Lima are the consumers of potable water. The assessment base is the 
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consumption of potable water in cubic metres for customers with a metered connection. For 
customers without a meter the assessment base is an assigned amount of cubic meters per 
connection which depends on the category of the customer and the continuity of water supply. 
Moreover, the assignation is higher for domestic customers living in wealthier districts than for 
those in neighbourhoods with a relatively low level of average income (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Assessment base assigned to water customers without meters in m3 per month in 
2009 
Category Up to 3 hours water 
supply per day 
4 to 6 hours water 
supply per day 
7 to 24 hours water supply 
per day 
Social 4 7 12 
Domestic  
Districts I 17 30 
Districts II 15 21 




I Provincia de Lima: Barranco, Breña, Cercado de Lima, Chorrillos, Cieneguilla, 
Jesús María, La Molina, La Victoria, Lince, Los Olivos, Magdalena del Mar, 
Miraflores, Pueble Libre, Rimac, San Borja, San Isidro, San Luis, San Miguel, 
Santiago de Surco, Surqillo 
Provincia de Callao: Bellavista, Callao, La Perla, La Punta 
II Provincia de Lima: Ancón, Ate, Carabayllo, Comas, Chaclacayo, El Agustino, 
Independencia, Lurigancho, Lurín, Pachacámac, Puente Piedra, Pucusana, San 
Martín de Porres, San Juan de Lurigancho, San Juan de Miraflores, Santa Anita, 
Surco Viejo, Villa Maria del Triunfo, Villa El Salvador, Santa Rosa 
Provincia de Callao: Carmen de la Legua, Ventanilla 
Source: (SUNASS 2006b, p. 324569) 
The level of the water price refers to the average cost of water supply and sanitation. Costs 
considered include investment costs, financing costs, operation and maintenance costs and taxes. 
However, the level of these costs is not based on real-world figures but rather on theoretical cost 
functions which would characterize an efficient model firm. Aguas Andinas, the water supplier of 
Chile’s capital Santiago de Chile, serves as a benchmark for this model firm (SUNASS 2006a). 
The tariff chosen to distribute this average price level to water users is depicted in Table 2. It is a 
two-part tariff including a fixed charge, which is irrespective of consumption, and a variable 
charge per unit of consumption. The variable charge is differentiated with respect to different 
user classes and categories: residential (social customers, e.g. public standpipes or hospitals, and 
regular domestic customers) and non-residential (commercial, industrial and state customers) 
users. Except for domestic customers, a uniform tariff applies for each category. Domestic 
customers are facing an increasing block tariff. The tariff is progressive since per cubic metre 
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prices increase with each block of consumption. If customers consume 21 to 30 cubic meters, the 
tariff of the second rank applies only to the consumption exceeding 20 cubic metres. If 
customers consume 31 to 50 cubic metres, the tariff of the second rank applies to entire first 30 
cubic metres and the tariff of the third rank to any consumption exceeding 30 cubic metres. For 
the ranks 51 to 80 cubic metres and more than 80 cubic metres, the tariff refers to the entire 
consumption of water. A special sanitation tariff applies to customers who have an own well at 
their disposal but are connected to the sanitation network (SUNASS 2006b). The by far most 
important tariff category is that of domestic customers. It accounts for more than 90 percent of 
the connections and 75 percent of the billed water volume (SEDAPAL 2007, p. 20). 
Table 2: Water tariff in Lima in 2009 
 Price in PEN 
Fixed Charge 4.444 
Class Category Range in m3 Price in PEN/m3 
Social >0 1.311 







Comercial >0 5.291 
Industrial >0 5.291 




Use of sanitation only  3.082 
Source: (SUNASS 2008b) 
Water users without grid connection mainly buy water from private water tankers. Prices required 
by water tankers are not regulated by the government. Rather, they are the result of free 
competition between water tankers. Moreover, they depend on the prices required at private and 
public wells and standpipes, which are in competition with each other as well. A 2003 study 
estimates that prices at which water tankers sold water varied from 5.65 PEN per cubic metre in 
the southern districts of Lima to 7.41 PEN per cubic metres in the north (FOVIDA 2003). The 
average price amounted to around 6.81 PEN. Thus, the price of decentralized water supply is 
significantly higher than that of grid-based supply. 
3.1.2 Institutional Environment 
One major institutional restriction is the availability and awareness of information related to 
water pricing in Lima. This holds true for water users as well as the water supplier. Expert 
interviews revealed that many water users do not seem to be aware of the actual scarcity of water 
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in Lima – and the sense of pricing as an indicator of the related costs and a means to stimulate 
water saving. This is particularly true for the numerous poor immigrants from the mountain 
range and rainforest areas which have experienced abundance of water and developed an 
according use of water. However, the lack of awareness can also be observed for wealthier 
inhabitants living in Lima for generations. It is often unknown to them where the potable water 
actually comes from and to where wastewater is discharged. Moreover, many water users in Lima 
may not be aware of the benefits of water supply. They do not understand, for example, that 
insufficient water supply and sanitation is directly related to diseases, such as diarrhoea. Finally, 
water consumers often assume that connection to the grid and individual metering will increase 
their water-related costs per se – even though this is not necessarily true. This is an important 
reason why water users may reject being connected to the network or getting a water meter 
installed (see, e.g., APDES 2007). Informational restrictions are also faced by the water supplier 
SEDAPAL. Stakeholders often argue that the company lacks sufficient resources to actually 
monitor and enforce water prices in the entire city. This task is particularly costly due to the city’s 
size and constant growth. In addition, corruption is also often cited by representatives of 
different institutions as a factor distorting the actual enforcement of water pricing in Lima. 
Apart from informational restrictions, general perceptions of water users may hamper the effects 
of water prices in Lima. In this respect, a strong refusal of any type of government intervention 
(including governmentally supplied and priced water) can be observed. This attitude is 
particularly common among immigrants from other parts of Peru and can be explained 
historically. In post-Colombian times, Lima has always been the capital of a centralized Peru. 
Peru’s political, economic and social elites were based in Lima. All of the countries resources 
went to the capital or abroad. In turn, Lima was oriented to the west, to the Pacific Ocean rather 
than to country’s inland. Thus, Peru in fact was divided into Lima and the rest of Peru. For this 
reason, many immigrants coming to Lima believe that they have a right to a share of Lima’s 
resources, including land and water. However, they do not expect the government to allocate this 
share to them since they have never received any support from it. They do not consider 
themselves as citizens with rights and duties. They rather see themselves as “conquerors” or 
“invaders” that have come to regain their share in Lima’s wealth. They “conquer” water by 
establishing illegal connections to the network. And they are not willing to be connected to the 
network and pay an additional charge to the government (the water supplier SEDAPAL is 
considered a synonym) who has already taken all resources from them (for an extensive 
discussion of these developments, see Matos Mar 2004).  
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3.1.3 Technical Environment 
This section specifies the characteristics of the technical environment illustrated in Figure 1 for 
Lima. 90 percent of Lima’s water users are connected to the water grid while ten percent depend 
on decentralized supply from water tankers. 70 percent of the grid connections are actually 
metered while the rest is billed on the basis of assigned consumption (SUNASS 2007). There 
seems to be no reliable data on the share of joint connections. Nevertheless, this share must be 
significant as the estimated number of supplied households (1.7 million) is substantially higher 
than the number of domestic connections (950,000) (SUNASS 2008a). 
3.2 Evaluation 
This section evaluates Lima’s water pricing system with respect to the criteria efficiency, cost 
recovery and affordability. As before, it distinguishes between the three dimensions which may 
have an effect on the performance of water pricing: water price design, institutional environment 
and technical environment. 
3.2.1 Water Price Design 
Level below full cost of water supply 
Regarding the efficiency of the level, it is first of all positive that water prices are set with respect to 
efficient levels of operation, maintenance and investment costs – not to real costs. Thereby, the 
water supplier has a strong incentive to optimize the use of resources employed for water supply 
and sanitation. Nevertheless, it is still to low in terms of efficiency as it does not consider 
opportunity costs and external environmental costs. The scarcity cost of water – i.e. the value of 
the actual resource, not the costs of processing it – is not taken into account. Moreover, the price 
should also reflect costs from discharging untreated wastewaters into the Pacific Ocean. Such 
costs may be incurred by local fisherman, for example, when pollution results in reduced catches. 
A further component of the water price should be expenditures which are necessary to maintain 
water catchments upstream in the Andes, e.g. to reduce deforestation and soil erosion. Such 
measures may be key to reducing the impacts of climate change on water supply (see, e.g., GEA 
2008). Yet, estimating these costs correctly may be a challenging task for decision-makers as they 
require a profound understanding of ecological, technical and economic interrelations. To 
summarize, the insufficient level of the water price results in incentives to save water which are 
too low from the point of view of efficiency. As a consequence, too much water is used for 
residential and non-residential water supply in Lima today – compared to other possible uses 
today and in the future.  
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The level of the water price does also not allow SEDAPAL to recover its costs. Experts estimate that 
the current price is only sufficient to cover operation and maintenance costs. Investments are 
mostly funded by the government or foreign organizations. A cost-recovering water price may 
need to be up to two times higher. The reason for this insufficiency is of course the theoretical 
model employed by SUNASS which assumes efficient cost functions to determine the average 
price level. This approach may be desirable for efficiency but it impairs cost recovery. Beyond 
this conflict of criteria, it may be questionable, however, whether cost functions of a private 
water supplier in Chile are a suitable benchmark for a public supplier in Peru. 
Of course, a low level improves the affordability of water pricing for water consumers in Lima. 
Thus, one underlying reason for the low price level may be that the government – which 
eventually also guides the decisions of the regulatory authority SUNASS – attaches more 
importance to affordability than to other criteria. This is particularly likely as water prices are a 
politically very sensitive issue in Lima – as throughout the entire developing world.  
No differentiation of assessment base 
The water price in Lima is imposed on water consumption. It is meant to cover the costs of 
potable water supply and sanitation. Theoretically, cost recovery is possible with this assessment 
base (as well as with any other) if the price level is chosen appropriately. However, the lacking 
differentiation of the assessment base impairs the efficiency of water pricing. Producers of 
wastewater do not face the correct level of sanitation costs which would correspond to their 
quantity and contamination of wastewater. Rather, sanitation costs are borne by all water 
consumers in equal shares depending on their water consumption. This implies that the water 
price is too low for users producing relatively dirty wastewaters and too high for relatively clean 
users. Moreover, water prices based on water consumption only do not set any incentive to 
pretreat wastewater before discharge. 
The suboptimal choice of the assessment base is also likely to compromise the affordability of 
water supply. Poor residential consumers can be assumed to produce less dirty wastewaters than 
industrial consumers, for example. When wastewater treatment costs are equally borne by all 
water users, this fact implies that poor residential consumers subsidize industrial customers. If the 
water price considered the quantity and contamination of wastewater, poor water users would 
probably pay a lower price than today.  
Differentiation of the tariff 
The tariff for Lima’s most important user category, domestic customers, is differentiated by 
consumption ranges. The main rationale behind this so-called increasing block tariff is usually 
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affordability (Boland and Whittington 2000). Users with high consumption pay a price beyond the 
average cost of water supply and sanitation. Users with low consumption are charged below 
average cost. This mechanism may indeed promote affordability as water demand is usually 
found to be a function of income. Empirical estimates for Lima suggest that a ten percent 
increase in income may result in a one to five percent higher demand for water (Yepes and 
Ringskog 2001, pp. 23-24; Ortiz and Bendezú 2006, p. 26; SUNASS 2006a, p. 41). 
Yet, the differentiation of the tariff – between user categories as well as between consumption 
ranges – clearly violates efficiency. The marginal price of water is not equal for all water consumers. 
In terms of social welfare, the incentive to save water is not sufficiently high for consumers 
facing a relatively low tariff (because either their consumption is low or they belong to a preferred 
user category). The opposite is true for users facing a relatively high tariff. Thus, tariff 
differentiation produces a trade-off between higher affordability and lower efficiency. 
In theory, the structure of the tariff is neutral with respect to cost recovery. An increasing block 
tariff can be designed such that the average cost of water supply and sanitation lies somewhere 
between the lowest and highest price and is covered by the average revenues per unit of water. In 
reality, however, this requirement may pose informational problems for the regulatory authority. 
In order to get the design right, the authority needs a very good understanding of the 
characteristics of water demand. In order to determine the first block, it has to find out about the 
subsistence level of water demand and the price which would allow poor consumers to afford 
this level. Moreover, it has to know about the water quantity consumed in any other block to 
calculate corresponding price which eventually cover overall costs. More importantly, 
determining the first block may also be politically challenging. Stakeholder pressure may result in 
a quantity that is too large and in a price that is too low (Boland and Whittington 2000). If this 
block becomes very large and cheap it may not be possible (or politically feasible) anymore to 
recover the corresponding subsidies by larger prices on other blocks. Thus, cost recovery may be 
impaired. This case can actually be observed in Lima. In fact, blocks have been designed such 
that 85 percent of the water consumers receive a subsidy while only 15 actually pay for it. These 
numbers contrast with the figure that only 20 percent of Lima’s population are considered as 
poor (SUNASS 2006a, p. 121). Under such circumstances, cost recovery may not be safeguarded 
in reality. 
3.2.2 Institutional Environment 
Institutional constraints and conditions appear to quite important for the actual effects of water 
pricing in Lima. On the one hand side, informational deficits and water-related perceptions on 
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part of water users result in substantial resistance against water pricing. On the other hand side, 
the water supplier SEDAPAL seems to be incapable of perfectly monitoring and enforcing water 
prices in Lima. As a result, evasion of water pricing is a serious issue in Lima. Four types of 
evasion may be exemplary: (1) Water users may establish unauthorized connections directly to the 
water network. In fact experts estimate that illegal withdrawals may account for up to 50 percent 
of the water losses within the grid. (2) Water users without metering, which pay a flat rate based 
on an assigned amount of water, may supply water to third parties without connection to the 
network. (3) Water meters may be manipulated or destroyed. (4) Commercial and industrial users 
may register as residential customers in order to be eligible for a lower water price. 
Evasion of water pricing is first of negative for cost recovery. If some units of water are not billed at 
all or below the correct price, real-world pricing does not correspond to the calculation which 
underlies the determination of the price level and tariff and is meant to provide for cost recovery. 
Moreover, if at least some units of water can be obtained without pricing, the overall incentive to 
save water is reduced as well. Thus, price evasion also impairs efficiency. In contrast, one may 
assume that price evasion improves the affordability of water. However, allowing for price evasion 
deliberately would question the credibility and integrity of the entire pricing system – and may 
result in a break-down of the pricing system. Moreover, there is no control on whether it is 
actually the poorest the benefit most from price evasion. 
3.2.3 Technical environment 
Insufficient coverage of grid connection 
The lack of connecting all water users to the public water network results in the existence of two 
parallel water pricing systems: one for grid-based supply with relatively low prices and another for 
decentralized supply with relatively high prices. This price discrimination clearly violates efficiency, 
which would call for uniform pricing. In terms of efficiency, grid-based water users consume too 
much while water consumption in neighbourhoods not connected to the network is suboptimally 
low. This price discrimination is also likely to impair the affordability of water pricing. It is 
predominantly the poor living in Lima’s peri-urban settlements, which are not connected to the 
network and pay the highest prices for water. The insufficient coverage of grid connection hardly 
affects the cost recovery of the water supplier as it depends on revenues from grid-based supply 
only. An indirect effect may be possible, though, given the assumption that water users 
depending on decentralized water supply may have a higher incentive than grid-based users to 




With joint connections, the water bill for one connection is usually divided equally by all water 
users depending on the connection. This distorts the efficiency of the incentive set by the water 
price. A water user is not charged for his actual consumption but for the average consumption of 
all users. This implies that the incentive to use an additional unit of water does not correspond to 
the full marginal price of that unit but only to the price divided by the number of co-users of the 
connection. Thus, the level of consumption of one user will be too high in terms of efficiency as 
he can partly externalize water costs to other users. 
The existence of joint connections may also have detrimental effects on affordability of an 
increasing block tariff. The more water users depend on one connection, the higher is the overall 
level of consumption for that connection. Therefore, joint connections are likely to be subject to 
a higher unit price than connections with a single user. When single connections are more 
common in wealthier districts and joint connections usually supply poor customers, the following 
effect may occur: Poor water users may end up subsidizing the water consumption of wealthier 
customers. Thus, the intended effect of an increasing block tariff with respect to affordability is 
in fact reversed. In the setting of joint connections, it is thus a major shortcoming of increasing 
block tariffs that they do not consider the number of persons depending on one connection (see, 
e.g., Boland and Whittington 2000). 
In theory, cost recovery should be possible with joint connections whenever the price level is chosen 
properly. In reality, however, an enforcement problem may impair the actual level of cost 
recovery. When joint connection is established for an entire building, single users within that 
building may not be disconnected from the network individually. In this case, it is impossible to 
sanction users which have not paid their bill. 
Insufficient coverage of metering 
In the absence of metering, consumers are assigned a fixed amount of water consumption. This 
amount is multiplied with the corresponding tariff and results in a flat rate to be paid 
irrespectively of actual consumption. Such flat rate impairs efficiency. The marginal incentive to 
save water is zero. Thus, customers can use a arbitrary quantity of water for whatever purpose 
without having to face any additional cost. 
The impact on cost recovery may be ambiguous. If actual water consumption is higher than the 
assigned amount of consumption, cost recovery is impaired. Otherwise, it may be improved. 
Similarly, the effect regarding affordability is unclear. If consumption is below the assigned amount, 
the per-unit price increases, and water becomes less affordable. The reverse is true when the 
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assignation of consumption is chosen too high. However, this latter effect is less likely to occur in 
Lima since water customers in poorer districts receive a lower assignation of consumption than 
those in wealthier areas. 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, an analytical framework is proposed to evaluate water pricing systems in developing 
countries. The framework rests on three evaluation criteria: (1) efficiency, addressing the welfare 
of the entire society, (2) cost recovery, addressing the needs of the water supplier and (3) 
affordability, addressing the needs of individual water users. To assess the performance of a water 
pricing system, it is highlighted that three dimensions of this system should be considered: (1) the 
design of the water pricing (including the payer, the assessment base, the level and the tariff), (2) 
the institutional environment (referring, for example, to legal and informational restrictions) and 
(3) the technical environment (considering, for example, the coverage of grid connection and 
metering). 
The framework is employed in this paper to evaluate the case study of the water pricing system in 
Lima, Peru. This analysis identifies several challenges which are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Overview of challenges to water pricing in Lima 
Dimension Challenge Efficiency Cost recovery Affordability
Level below full cost - - + 
No differentiation of 
assessment base - o - 
Water price 
design 
Differentiation of tariff - o/- + 
Institutional 
environment Evasion of pricing - - o/+ 
Insufficient coverage 
of grid connection - o - 
Joint connections - o/- - Technical environment 
Insufficient coverage 
of metering - +/- +/- 
The analysis has shown that several modifications in Lima’s water pricing system would be 
necessary to improve its overall performance. First of all, modifications of the water price design 
are required. In order to increase efficiency and cost recovery, the price level should be increased. 
Indeed, such increase would challenge the affordability of water pricing. However, the 
affordability should be improved not by choosing a low average price level but by designing the 
tariff differentiation more properly. Here, price subsidies should be targeted to those users that 
are actually poor. Moreover, the price differentiation should be linked more directly to income in 
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order to avoid the adverse effects of increasing block tariffs in the presence of joint connections. 
Such differentiation may pose challenges regarding the necessary information on income, of 
course. However, such information seems to be available in Lima from databases of the Ministry 
of Finance and Economy. A corresponding modification has already been envisaged by the 
regulatory agency SUNASS (SUNASS 2008a). A further necessity with respect to water price 
design is the differentiation of the assessment base of water prices with respect to potable water 
consumption, wastewater production and wastewater generation. The implementation of such 
differentiation will be challenging for residential customers were metering would be tedious. 
However, it should be possible for large industrial customers which are responsible for 
wastewaters with major pollutant loads. A final requirement regarding water price design is the 
implementation of some kind of price regulation for decentralized water supply. This 
improvement would help to increase the overall efficiency of water use and the affordability of 
water for users not connected to the network. 
Moreover, the analysis has also revealed that measures should not only address the design of the 
water price but also certain features of the institutional and technical environment. Measures 
should include, for example, information and awareness campaigns which highlight the scarcity 
of water and the benefits of regular water supply and metering. Such activities may help to reduce 
the opposition against and promote the enforcement of water prices. Moreover, policies and 
investments are necessary to improve the technical infrastructure – e.g. the coverage of grid 
connection, the coverage of metering and the installation of water saving and water treatment 
technologies. Such measures are likely to improve the overall performance and may even 
substitute tedious modifications of policy design. For example, regulation of decentralized supply 
would not be necessary if all water users were connected to the water network. Similarly, if all 
users had individual, metered connections the disadvantages of increasing block tariffs with 
respect to affordability could be reduced – and a more complex tariff considering income directly 
would not be needed. Most likely, however, a successful reform has to be based on a mixture of 
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